Why The Premier League Big Boys Broke With Tradition
Harry Redknapp and Tottenham’s progression through the Champion’s League this season has reignited the 4-4-2 in European ties. So it seems a fitting juncture to discuss the reasons behind English teams disposing of the, until then, traditional two-striker system early in the previous decade.
Until the mid-2000s – and in many quarters, even today – tactical flexibility in a team was derided by fans and the media in England as a form of weakness. A traditional 4-4-2, without much variety at all, had been the cultural coda since Charles Hughes’ FA coaching policy was written. There is also a societal antipathy directed toward the tinkerer in this country (he is confused, without knowledge of his best XI etc) whereas in, say, Italy if a manger’s tactical scheme changes in relation to the opponents he faces, he is seen as looking for solutions. Being reactive isn’t as weak an ideal as many deem it where football is concerned.
“We [English footballers and coaches] do not think about tactics…The 4-4-2 is the easiest formation to play if you’re poor technically and we’ve never been the best in terms of technique.” –David Platt
Platt’s point is not unfounded; tactical flexibility is contingent on technical mastery. Why 4-4-2 became the prescribed approach to our game is not the question at hand but it is interesting to wonder: historically, do we play 4-4-2 because we don’t have the players? Or do we not have the players because we play 4-4-2?
It’s obvious to note that English dominance in the Champions League over the past 5 or 6 years has been without the 4-4-2. Liverpool, Chelsea, Manchester United, and Arsenal have all made it to the semi-finals or more and none have employed the traditional 4-4-2. The reason for this is simple; European football demands tactical flexibility and other teams, particularly the Italians, have been clinically adept in the past at dismantling the formation. Ferguson talks openly about the discipline and flexibility he desired in Europe, especially after losing to Marcelo Lippi’s Juventus:
“I remember playing Juve in the mid-1990s…We get a throw-in near the corner flag. Gary Neville takes the throw and Alen Boksic goes up the other end and scores…That was it, one-nil and that was all they needed. We learned from that…Italians don’t get caught on counter attacks like that. We had to learn to do the same.”
Arsene Wenger is a believer of the 4-4-2 not due to any romantic notions of English tradition but because of its efficient coverage of space on the football pitch:
“I think it’s the most rational formation in most cases. With a 4-4-2, sixty per cent of your players are covering sixty per cent of the pitch. No other formation is as efficient at covering space.”
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November 28th, 2010
Chelsea’s signing of Claude Makelele changed the face of English football! It’s as simple as that. Let me explain…
As you’ve pointed out, there used to be a clear preference for 4-4-2 in England. The formation encouraged the selection of more well-rounded central midfield players – the ones that can defend, attack, pass, tackle, shoot, assist and run – Roy Keane, Patrick Vieira et al.
Makelele was nothing of the sort – here we had a player that was brought in with a specific role – he’d patrol a small area between the backline and midfield. The problem with having such a ‘limited’ player was that, whilst it afforded you greater insurance, it meant that you were diminished from an attacking point of view. Instead of having two all-round central midfielders, you were now reduced to one. The solution? To pull another midfielder in from somewhere.
Chelsea were aided by the fact that they had a young Didier Drogba in their ranks as well – another change to the English game in the past decade was the idea of having one ‘complete’ striker instead of a dovetailing pair – think Henry-Bergkamp, Hasselbaink-Gudjohnsen, Phillips-Quinn, Yorke-Cole. Managers began to realise that you could get these imposing centre forwards on their own and they could still occupy an opposition backline.
Another factor is the proliferation of quasi wingers/strikers (inside forwards) – instead of having straight line, touchline huggers, we started to get wide players who moved laterally, outside to inside – this meant they were getting in closer to the striker and providing support.
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As an aside – you suggest that United were one of the English sides to enjoy European success having spurned 4-4-2. If you cast your mind back to 2008 in Moscow, you’ll recall that we started 4-4-2 and absolutely pulverised Chelsea for the opening half. But it was all about the personnel we played – Hargreaves started on the right wing.
There are loads of other examples of 4-4-2 being a perfectly effective formation, but it’s all about the players that you pick and it’s key to get nice and compact when you lose the ball.
November 28th, 2010
Bob I gotta agree about players above system. Everyone talks about Rinus Michels having a pre determined ideal of Total Football with Ajax but that’s not the case. It was a natural progression of the ridiculously talented and unique players he had at his disposal.
As an aside, you’re right about United vs Chelsea. But to get there was a lot of single striker away ties in Europe for a good few years…
December 2nd, 2010
Great article, followed by some really good responses.